Symbols having meaning
Truth of symbols
Formal conditions of the force of symbols
|Peirce, C.S. (1867 / 1982). Writings of Charles S. Peirce. A chronological Edition. Vol. 2. 1867-1871. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. S.57.|
We come, therefore, to this, that logic treats of the reference of symbols in general to their objects. In this view it is one of a trivium of conceivable sciences.
The first would treat of the formal conditions of symbols having meaning, that is of the reference of symbols in general to their grounds or imputed characters, and this might be called formal grammar;
the second, logic, would treat of the formal conditions of the truth of symbols;
and the third would treat of the formal conditions of the force of symbols, or their power of appealing to a mind, that is, of their reference in general to interpretants, and this might be called formal rhetoric.
There would be a general division of symbols, common to all these sciences; namely, into,
1°: Symbols which directly determine only their grounds or imputed qualities, and are thus but sums of marks or terms;
2°: Symbols which also independently determine their objects by means of other term or terms, and thus, expressing their own objective validity, become capable of truth or falsehood, that is, are propositions; and,
3°: Symbols which also independently determine their interpretants, and thus the minds to which they appeal, by premising a proposition or propositions which such a mind is to admit. These are arguments. And it is remarkable that, among all the definitions of the proposition, for example, as the oratio indicativa, as the subsumption of an object under a concept, as the expression of the relation of two concepts, and as the indication of the mutable ground of appearance, there is, perhaps, not one in which the conception of reference to an object or correlate is not the important one. In the same way, the conception of reference to an interpretant or third, is always prominent in the definitions of argument.